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Introduction 
For over two decades, Scotland has been a major benefici-
ary of the regional policy of the European Union (EU). By 
2006, it is expected that Scotland will have received 
around £7 billion under the Structural Funds since the 
inception of ERDF in 1975. During the 1990s, when 
Structural Fund expenditure in Scotland was at its maxi-
mum, some two thirds of the Scottish population were 
covered by areas eligible for EU regional policy support, 
averaging over £250 million per year. In the current budget 
planning period (2000-2006), Scotland will receive a total 
of £1,094 million for the various EU-funded programmes 
now under way. 
This European funding is now under threat. As the EU 
prepares for enlargement to take in up to 12 new members 
over the next decade, plans are being made to redirect 
Structural Funds to the poorer countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Many of these countries have income 
levels well below those of the EU Member States, with 
extensive poverty, underdevelopment and industrial 
dereliction. Tackling these problems will be the priority for 
future EU regional policy, with any remaining available 
Structural Funds going largely to the present less-developed 
countries of the EU - Greece, Portugal and Spain. Without 
an increase in EU budgetary resources, it seems unlikely 
that the richer EU Member States, including the UK, can 
expect to receive much, or maybe any, funding under EU 
regional policy, after the end of the current budgetary 
period in 2006. 
The following paper considers the implications of the next 
reform of EU regional policy for Scotland. It begins by 
reviewing the political context for enlargement and the 
economic development challenges, and then reviews the 
emerging debate on scenarios for reform, identifying the 
issues for Scotland. 
Enlargement of the European union 
Enlargement scenarios 
In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council made the 
commitment that1: "the associated countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of 
the European Union." Eight years on, and the European 
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Union (EU) has offered the s tatus of 'Candidate Country' 
(CC) to 13 appl icants 2 , but none has yet received a fixed 
date for accession. The EU opened formal negotiat ions in 
March 1 9 9 8 with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia, and in February 2 0 0 0 with 
Mal ta, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria. 
Each of the appl icant countr ies has to negotiate their 
adopt ion of some 3 0 'chapters ' of the legal and policy 
f ramework (acquis communautai re) of the EU. These range 
f rom the 'basic f reedoms' , relat ing to free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capi tal , to complex issues of 
compet i t ion policy, taxat ion and agricultural support . 
The progress of the negotiat ions varies. Whereas Cyprus, 
Hungary and Slovenia have concluded around three-
quarters of the negotiat ion chapters, Poland is sti l l discuss-
ing 12 of the 3 0 chapters, inc luding fundamenta l aspects 
concerning the f ree movement of persons and capi ta l , 
whi le Romania and Bulgaria have not even begun negotia-
t ions in several policy areas. In its latest report on the 
progress of the accession negotiat ions, the European 
Commission considers tha t ten of the 13 CCs - Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Li thuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia3 - will be capable of 
part ic ipat ing in the ' f i rst wave' of enlargement. Negotia-
t ions should be concluded wi th the 'best prepared coun-
t r ies ' by the end of 2 0 0 2 . It is an open question whether 
all ten , ' f irst wave' CCs accede together - which would 
imply delaying enlargement to suit the country with the 
longest preparat ion t ime - or whether they accede at 
di f ferent t imes over a 3-4 year period. Whatever the 
sequence, it is likely that by 2 0 0 6 the EU will have ex-
panded to 25 Member States.4 
Impact of enlargement 
From a macroeconomic perspective, most studies predict 
tha t the impact of enlargement will be favourable. For 
example, the latest report on EU enlargement 5 , considers 
that it will be a "posit ive-sum game for the part ies in-
volved", with signif icant benef i ts for the Candidate Coun-
tr ies and also increased growth in the EU-15. Enlargement 
has often been discussed in a negative language of ' threats 
of compet i t ion ' , an ' influx of migrants ' and 'cost burdens' , 
but these fears are frequently overstated. 6 The EU-15 
currently have a - 2 5 bill ion t rade surplus with Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEECs), and there is no 
indication tha t the CEECs const i tute severe trade compet i -
t ion for the EU countr ies. Similarly, the CEE economies 
host a stock of • 27 bill ion of foreign direct investment f rom 
EU countr ies, the major part of which is motivated by 
market access; investment in CEE is created rather than 
diverted f rom elsewhere in the EU. Further, detai led 
analyses do not suggest massive out-migrat ion from CEE 
countr ies after enlargement and foresee only minor, and by 
no means necessarily negative, effects on wages and 
employment in the EU. 
This is not to underest imate the challenge of enlargement 
for the economic and social cohesion of the EU. Widening 
the EU to include 27 Member States would increase the 
terri tory of the Union by 3 4 percent and its populat ion by 
2 8 percent, whereas the average GDP per capita would 
decline by approximately 15 percent. Accession of the 
Central and Eastern European countr ies would radically 
alter the EU maps of regional problems and disparit ies. 
Agriculture dominates regional employment structures in 
the transi t ion countr ies to a much greater extent than in 
the EU-15, much of the industr ial sector is out-dated, and 
the service sector remains under-developed, especially 
outside the capital c i t ies. 
The EU-CC di f ferences in income are wide. In 1998 , the 
average GDP per capita (in PPS) of the 12 CCs was only 38 
percent of the level in the EU-15. At regional level, the 
disparit ies are sti l l greater. Only two CEE regions, Prague 
and Bratislava, have GDP per capita levels above the EU 
average. Three-quarters of the CCs populat ion are in 
regions with a GDP per head of less than 4 0 percent of the 
EU-15 average, inc luding all of the Baltic States, and 
Poland (except for the Warsaw region), Romania (except for 
Bucharest) and Bulgaria. 
The growth rates of the Candidate Countries are currently 
running at high levels, but they are st i l l only just recovering 
f rom the col lapse in GDP in 1989 -92 . By 1998 , only Poland 
and Slovenia (among the CEECs), had exceeded their pre-
transi t ion level. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
were poised to exceed this level in 2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 1 , but in other 
CEECs recovery was st i l l some way off. It is also clear that 
convergence with the EU-15 is a long-term challenge. 
Scenarios of long-run nat ional and regional GDP growth in 
the appl icant countr ies suggest that it could take 30-40 
years (under opt imist ic growth condit ions) for the leading 
CEEC economies - Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia - to reach the EU-15 average. 
Implications for EU regional policy 
The political debate 
One of the key policy issues associated with enlargement is 
how the EU will respond to these new maps of economic 
and social disparity in an enlarged EU. As in the past, the 
volume of resources for EU regional policy, and its alloca-
t ion among countr ies and regions, wil l depend on polit ical 
bargaining among Member States. There are several, 
potentially conf l ic t ing sets of interests. 
First, the magni tude of the development challenge in 
Central and Eastern Europe will require the EU to maximise 
and sustain the appl icat ion of regional policy resources to 
assist the economic t ransi t ion and restructur ing processes 
underway in the CCs, in part icular to enable all regions and 
social groups to benef i t f rom enlargement. The CCs have 
already made it clear tha t they want to be treated fairly, 
receiving the same kind of ent i t lement to Structural and 
Cohesion Funds as the current poorer countr ies of the EU. 
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A second set of concerns has been expressed by the poorer 
EU-15 countr ies, whose relative stat is t ica l posit ion will 
' improve' in an enlarged EU. Several of the current ly el igible 
regions will no longer qualify for Objective 1 suppor t when 
the average EU income level is reduced by the accession of 
st i l l poorer countr ies f rom Central and Eastern Europe. 
Arguing that the severity of the i r regional problems will sti l l 
need to be addressed, countr ies such as Spain are seeking 
assurances tha t their current receipts wi l l be main ta ined by 
an increase in the EU st ructura l operat ions budget. 
A th i rd v iewpoint is t ha t of t h e richer Member States who 
wan t to l imit add i t iona l budgetary contr ibut ions. Some 
countr ies are determined to prevent a s igni f icant increase 
in the EU budget. Germany, for example, as the largest 
contr ibutor, has already indicated that it does not want to 
see the current EU budgetary cei l ing (1.27 percent of EU 
GNP) raised after en largement . The richer states are 
concerned tha t few, if any, of their regions may qualify for 
Structural Fund suppor t af ter 2 0 0 6 , leading to a worsening 
of their 'net payment ' posi t ion, i.e. their contr ibut ions to 
the EU budget wil l no longer be part ly returned in the form 
o fS t ruc tu ra l Fund receipts. 
Lastly, the European Commission (EC) - which is not 
neutral in th is mat ter - is t ry ing to st ructure the debate to 
mainta in or increase the EU role in regional policy. For 
example, the EC has rejected the opt ion of any kind of 
' renat ional isat ion ' of EU regional policy and seems to be 
avoiding any fundamenta l review of the object ives of policy. 
Instead, it is encouraging considerat ion of an EU regional 
policy tha t embraces the needs of the Candidate Countr ies, 
the current Cohesion Countr ies and other less-developed 
regions, as wel l as a cont inued EU role in address ing the 
problems of old- industr ia l regions, rural regions and 
sparsely populated areas in the EU-15, combined with a 
new focus on urban centres. 
Al though the decis ions on the fu ture of Structural Funds lie 
at least four years ahead, the debate has already begun in 
earnest. The EC publ ished its Second Cohesion Report in 
January 2 0 0 1 , out l in ing some quest ions and priori t ies for 
Structural Fund reform, fol lowed by a debate at the Euro-
pean Cohesion Forum in May 2 0 0 1 . An updated Cohesion 
Report is likely early in 2 0 0 2 , fo l lowed by a series of EC 
seminars on the terr i tor ia l , sectoral and inst i tu t ional 
priori t ies for fu ture EU regional policy. Some of the Member 
States have begun to publ ish studies on the impl icat ions of 
enlargement for EU regional policy, wi th a range of possible 
scenar ios and opt ions. 
One strand of th ink ing is to concentrate EU regional policy 
exclusively on the less-developed parts of the EU, el iminat-
ing aid to regions in the richer countr ies. For example, it 
has been suggested tha t the r icher countr ies could 'opt out ' 
of Structural Funds and contr ibute less to the EU budget. A 
di f ferent idea is to focus EU regional policy on nat ional 
rather than regional convergence, providing suppor t to the 
poorer countr ies (for example those with a nat ional GDP 
per capita of less than 90 percent of the EU average) rather 
PAGE 30 
than to poor regions. The advantage of such ideas is tha t 
they could br ing more economic coherence to EU regional 
policy, ending the 'circular f low of money' f rom rich coun-
tr ies to the EU and back again, as well as removing the 
bureaucracy associated wi th implement ing relatively smal l 
amounts of fund ing spread over many regions. The 
downside is tha t EU regional policy would be restr icted to 
the CEECs, Greece, Portugal and Spain and could increas-
ingly become to be seen as a 'welfare policy', potential ly 
d imin ish ing the poli t ical cohesion of the EU. 
A second s t rand of the debate involves ideas to mainta in a 
'universal ' regional policy tha t includes most if not all 
Member States, ensur ing that both richer and poorer 
countr ies retain a vested interest in the policy area. Some 
have suggested an increase in the EU budgetary resources 
devoted to EU regional policy (by as much as 4 0 percent), 
a l lowing the current system to be extended eastwards while 
retaining suppor t for exist ing recipients. Others have 
proposed a gradual is t t ransi t ion per iod, whereby the loss of 
Structural Funds to ineligible regions is phased in over a 
lengthy t rans i t ion period of up to 15 years to allow t hem to 
adapt . A fur ther idea is to have dif ferent ial regional policy 
suppor t , with one approach for the CCs and another, lower 
level approach for the EU-15. A more radical var iant is to 
mainta in regional policy suppor t in the richer countr ies, but 
provided exclusively through 'Community Init iat ives'. 
Reallocating the Structural Funds 
Central to the debate is the quest ion of resources, notably 
the addi t ional cost to the EU budget of providing EU 
regional policy fund ing to the CCs and the loss of enti t le-
men t of exist ing recipients in the EU-15. The s ta r t ing point 
is to establ ish the budgetary parameters. At the end of the 
current f inancia l p lanning period (2006) , the EU has 
budgeted for possible annual spending on regional policy of 
some • 4 2 . 3 bi l l ion, approximately 4 0 percent of the EU 
budget. At th is point, the share of the current EU Member 
States will have fal len to • 29 .2 bi l l ion. This reduction will 
al low EU spending on structural policy in the Candidate 
Countries of up to • 12 .3 bi l l ion. In other words, the current 
EU budgetary f ramework has already begun a t ransfer of 
substant ia l , s t ructural policy resources eastwards. 
The populat ion of the likely ' f i rst wave' Candidate Countries 
is 75 .2 mil l ion people (106 mil l ion including Romania and 
Bulgaria). In an enlarged EU, most of th is populat ion would 
be eligible for Objective 1 s tatus, al though some regions 
would not qualify - all of Slovenia and the cit ies of Prague 
(Czech Republic), Bratislava (Slovakia) and possibly Buda-
pest (Hungary). If the eligible regions received the maxi-
mum levels of Structural Fund aid of • 3 4 8 per head, 
currently received by Portugal, th is would represent a cost 
of • 24 -26 bi l l ion. On the other hand, EU t ransfers to the 
CCs are subject to a so-called 'absorpt ion l imit ' of four 
percent of nat ional GDP, on the basis tha t th is is the 
max imum amount tha t the CCs would be able to manage 
and spend effectively. Applying th is l imit to a projected GDP 
for the CCs could reduce the maximum level of their 
receipts to nearer • 15 bi l l ion. 
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Several recent studies have at tempted to refine these 
calculat ions, tak ing account of di f ferent GDP growth rates, 
al location thresholds and levels of aid intensity. Their 
est imates of the addi t ional , post -2006, budgetary require-
ments for Structural Funds range f rom • 12 bil l ion to a lmost 
• 3 0 bill ion per year, with an average of circa • 2 1 bil l ion per 
year. Taking account of the fact tha t the EU is already 
budget ing for an annual cost of post-enlargement structural 
operat ions of • 12 bi l l ion, then the 'gap' between what is 
required and what is available may be as high as • 18 bill ion 
but may be less than • 1 bi l l ion, with an average f igure in 
the range - 9 - 1 0 bil l ion. 
The impl icat ions of these f igures are two-fold. First, if the 
absorpt ion l imit is applied strictly, then the transfers to the 
new EU members will probably be less than was projected 
by earlier studies. Even wi thout a formal l imit, the current 
level of administrat ive and f inancial management capacity 
in many CCs could restrict the volume of transfers. Second, 
the cutbacks in receipts for the EU-15 will be sizeable, but 
considerable fund ing may sti l l be available after 2 0 0 6 . If 
the above f igures are correct, then the current receipts of 
the EU-15 would have to be reduced by about 30 percent -
equivalent to the entire Objective 2 budget and one-third of 
the Objective 1 budget. However, even wi thout an increase 
in budgetary resources, some • 10-15 bil l ion might sti l l be 
available to the EU-15, and possibly as much as • 20 bi l l ion. 
For the EU, th is would mean that the current recipients 
could cont inue to benefi t f rom the Structural Funds. Some 
would sti l l qualify for Objective 1 support , even in an 
enlarged EU. Of the 83 mil l ion people currently covered by 
Objective 1 , 33 -38 mil l ion would retain eligibil ity in an EU-
25 or EU-27 (albeit with lower levels of aid per head), 
mainly regions in Greece, Portugal and Spain, but also a 
few regions in Italy and Germany. Further, those Objective 1 
areas that were 'de-designated' would probably be eligible 
for some transi t ional support . On the basis of precedent, 
the richer countr ies might also insist that cutbacks in 
Objective 2 should again be subject to some kind of 'safety 
net ' , ensur ing some cont inued resources for industr ial 
reconversion and rural development. There will also be 
pressure to retain employment and t ra in ing assistance 
under Objective 3 and inter-regional and urban support 
under the Community Init iatives. 
This line of argument pre-supposes that the current method 
of d ist r ibut ing Structural Funds is mainta ined. Certainly, 
there will be pressure from both national treasuries and the 
wide range of regional and sectoral interest groups with a 
stake in the Funds to retain as much of the current receipts 
as possible. On the other hand, there is a need - as well an 
opportuni ty - for real reform of the Structural Funds, to 
improve its economic development logic and effect iveness. 
This would involve ending EU subsidies in the richer 
countr ies and concentrat ing them in the poorer parts of an 
enlarged EU, as well as giving considerat ion to fundamenta l 
changes in the way the funds are designed and imple-
mented. 
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Implications for Scotland 
As noted at the start of this article, Scotland has done well 
out of the Structural Funds. Over the period 1975 to 1999, 
at least £5,483 million of Structural Funds were allocated 
to Scotland, with a further £1,094 million programmed for 
the period 2000-06 (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Structural Fund Allocations to Scotland, 2000-06 
• millions £ millions 
Objective 1 (Highlands &lslands 
Special Programme) 300 194 
Objective 2 (Western, East and 
South Scotland) 807 521 
Objective 3 (all Scotland, except 
Highlands & Islands) 481 310 
Community Initiatives 105 68 
Total 1,693 1,094 
Source: Scottish Executive 
Looking to the future, Scotland has a choice as to how it 
approaches the reform debate. The first option would be to 
adopt a strategy of maximising Structural Fund receipts to 
Scotland, as in the past. On the basis of the more optimis-
tic assumptions discussed above, significant amounts of 
Structural Funds might still be available making it worth-
while to influence the EU debate and the UK negotiating 
line in Scotland's interests. Possibilities for exploiting the 
criteria used for area designation and funding allocation 
might be as follows. 
-> Economic criteria. At present, economic criteria are 
used for designating Objective 1 areas (using GDP per 
capita). There would appear to be no scope for Scot-
land to have any areas qualifying under such economic 
criteria. In an EU-27, the Highlands & Islands would 
have an estimated GDP per capita of 87.9 percent of 
the EU average, well above the 75 percent threshold. 
Following the example of Cornwall and West Wales, a 
sub-division of the Highlands & Islands (eg. to exclude 
Inverness) may have more possibilities, but it is 
doubtful whether the EC would accept this. It may be 
possible to argue for different criteria, but, given that 
the EU has made such a virtue of applying the Objec-
tive 1 criterion strictly in the recent negotiations, it is 
unlikely that other economic criteria would be consid-
ered. 
- ^ Social criteria. In recent reforms, unemployment and 
employment structure have been the key indicators for 
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des ignat ing Objective 2 areas. If Objective 2 is re-
ta ined , it is probable t ha t some Member States wil l 
argue for a 'safety net ' to be appl ied, l imi t ing cutbacks 
to one-third of current coverage. Given that any fu ture 
Objective 2 suppor t would be highly focused on 'areas 
of need' , there would be scope for the urban areas of 
Scot land to benef i t . However, Scot land's unemployment 
indicators (unemployment rate, youth employment , 
long-term unemployment) are relatively good compared 
to most other EU Member States and regions, exacer-
bated by t he high proport ion of t he workforce in urban 
areas (such as Glasgow) not included in the employ-
ment s tat is t ics. Therefore, Scot land may need to argue 
for a d i f ferent stat ist ical approach, potential ly focusing 
on social inclusion, a l though it is d i f f icu l t to f ind 
indicators capable of compar ing social inclusion across 
regions wi th in countr ies (let a lone across t he EU). Even 
if Objective 2 is d iscont inued, the EC is proposing 
cont inued intervent ion in several f ie lds (areas of 
industr ia l restructur ing, d iversi f icat ion of rural areas, 
deprived urban areas and social inclusion) tha t may 
• benef i t t he current recipients. 
-> Geographical cr i teria. As in 1998 -99 , Scot land could 
a t tempt to make ' common cause' wi th Sweden and 
Finland to publ ic ise the special problems of 
per ipheral i ty and the 'Nor thern Dimens ion ' with a view 
to retaining special provision for areas of low popula-
t ion density. It is perhaps quest ionable whether, at the 
polit ical level, Finland or Sweden would be prepared to 
back a relaxation of the populat ion densi ty criteria to 
benef i t Scot land. Historically, there has been l i tt le 
unders tand ing or sympathy for the prob lems of remote 
Nordic areas in either the Commission or other Mem-
ber States (al though the Treaty does make a commit-
ment to remote areas and islands). Nevertheless, in its 
list of fu ture priori t ies, the EC has ident i f ied "areas 
suf fer ing f rom geographical or natural handicaps" as a 
possible target for suppor t . Given tha t the populat ions 
in such areas are smal l , and the f inancia l cost to the 
EU budget is relatively low, pol i t ical pressure could 
potential ly secure special provision for remote areas in 
the Nordic countr ies and Scot land. 
There might, therefore, be possible f inancia l benef i ts for 
Scot land in arguing for retent ion of the s ta tus quo and 
seeking to inf luence the social and geographical criteria 
used for determin ing el igible areas and f inancia l a l locat ions 
for the 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 1 3 per iod. 
An al ternat ive opt ion would be for Scot land to make a more 
radical contr ibut ion to the debate. This would mean mak ing 
a case for reforms to EU regional policy to improve its 
impact in the less-developed countr ies of the current EU 
and fu ture Member States, but potential ly at a f inancia l 
cost of losing fu ture Structural Fund receipts in Scot land. 
This would be a very communauta i re approach, s imi lar to 
tha t taken by the Irish Government i.e. recognising that the 
country has done well out of Structural Funds over many 
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years and now it is the turn of others to benef i t as much as 
possible. 
The advantage of th is approach is tha t arguments for 
changes to EU regional policy would be much stronger 
wi thout the suspic ion of 'special p leading' tha t character-
ises many of the contr ibut ions to the debate. It would build 
on the profi le tha t Scot land has already establ ished in the 
reform debate and would at t ract internat ional a t tent ion. 
Scot land's approach to many aspects of Structural Funds is 
wel l respected abroad, and advocacy of CC interests would 
benef i t the increasingly impor tant role tha t Scott ish 
organisat ions are playing in the regional development f ie ld 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The disadvantages of th is approach are four-fold. First, if 
t he above budget f igures are credible, then it is likely tha t 
other Member States and regions will seek to ensure 
cont inued receipt of Structural Funds, and it may be 
di f f icul t to explain why Scot land is not energetically pursu-
ing the same approach. The Structural Funds have an 
extremely high profi le in Scot land in relat ion to their value, 
and the numerous organisat ions tha t have benef i ted f rom 
the Funds would be vocal in seeking retent ion of these 
benef i ts . Second, if the EU cont inues to pursue 'coherence' 
between Communi ty and nat ional regional policy maps, loss 
of Structural Funds could potential ly damage the coverage 
of nat ional regional aid areas in Scot land. Third, the 
Structural Funds have been used to pioneer innovative 
ways of del iver ing economic development in Scotland - for 
example, with respect to integrated regional strategies, 
programme management , partnership working, 
sustainabi l i ty, equal opportuni t ies, evaluat ion - which are 
recognised across the EU. Withdrawal of the Funds risks 
th is expert ise being lost. 
Conclusions 
EU enlargement is the most ambi t ious project ever under-
taken by the Union, with far-reaching consequences for 
many aspects of European integrat ion. The major economic 
and social d i f ferences between the current Member states 
and Candidate Countries mean that the EU will have to 
focus much of its resources on assist ing the new members 
to cope with structural change, under-development and 
poverty. EU regional policy will need to be redirected and 
adapted to meet the needs of the CCs, with potential ly 
s igni f icant impl icat ions for current recipients in the EU-15. 
A debate about the reform of the Structural Funds has 
already begun. While some see enlargement as an opportu-
nity for much-needed reform of EU regional policy, focusing 
its ef forts on the poorest countr ies, others would prefer to 
f ind a way of manipu la t ing the budgetary al location criteria 
to retain a role for the Structural Funds in rich as well as 
poor countr ies. 
For Scot land, these are impor tant issues, and, as the 
debate gathers pace over the coming years, the Scott ish 
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Executive wil l need to determine a policy posit ion for 
Scot land. As in previous years, it could adopt a strategy of 
t ry ing to maximise receipts, but the Executive could also 
play a role in pressing for reforms of EU regional policy to 
improve the longer-term eff iciency and effect iveness of the 
Structural Funds. When the formal negotiat ions star t , 
Scot land's interests will need to be integrated with the 'UK 
l ine' as part of the debate between Member States. 
However, these negotiat ions are probably at least 2-3 years 
away, and, in the meant ime, there is scope for Scotland to 
be ar t icu lat ing some imaginat ive and innovative ideas. 
In th is context, the fundamenta l quest ions are whether and 
how the 'pork barrel pol i t ics' of EU negotiat ions can be 
changed. Previous reforms of the Structural Funds have 
been characterised by each Member State trying to maxim-
ise its share of the Funds. The message that the EU is 
mak ing a signif icant and important commi tment to cohe-
sion is often lost amidst the debate of whether supposed 
national interests have been advanced or not. In the 
context of EU enlargement, a protracted argument over the 
share-out of Structural Funds risks promot ing division and 
polit ical confl ict where a show of unity and solidarity is 
most needed. 
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